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European Union Crises and Irish Public Opinion: Continuity and 
Change in Patterns of Support 
 
Abstract: Individuals in Ireland are one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European 
integration since accession to the European Union (EU) in 1973 often coined as ‘good 
Europeans with a pro-integrationist attitude’. The economic and financial crisis is regarded as 
a turning point in Ireland's relationship with the EU as a result of the economic downturn and 
the widening of economic disparities individuals have experienced. Meanwhile, Brexit poses 
significant and specific challenges to Ireland and has the capacity to impact Irish attitudes 
towards the EU. Using a combination of Standard Eurobarometer data from 2007 – 2018 and 
a variety of opinion polling data, this paper will examine how the economic crisis and Brexit 
have shaped Irish attitudes towards the EU.  
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Since the economic and financial crisis trends in public opinion suggest that citizens of 
the European Union (EU) are becoming more critical of the EU project as individuals perceive 
themselves to be at heightened risk of economic insecurity as a consequence of economic 
problems in their EU member state and the EU as a whole. Nevertheless, recent research has 
demonstrated that while individuals in Ireland were disappointed and indeed angered by the 
performance of the EU during the economic crisis, in particular among those who experienced 
increased economic instability, overall individuals in Ireland remain enthusiastic supporters of 
the EU project (Simpson, 2018a and 2018b). Brexit meanwhile poses another period of 
instability – both economically and politically -  for individuals in Ireland specifically for 
bilateral relations with the UK on economic and trading matters and the pursuit of Irish 
objectives as an EU member state.  
This paper comprehensively examines Irish attitudes towards the EU using a 
combination of Standard Eurobarometer data from 2007 – 2018 and opinion polling data from 
both Red C and Ireland Thinks analysing variables such as whether membership of the EU is 
a good thing, whether Ireland has benefited from EU membership, attitudes towards an Irish 
exit of the EU as well as the most important issue individuals in Ireland are facing. The paper 
shows firstly the importance individuals place on both the economic crisis and the Brexit crisis 
and secondly how this shapes Irish attitudes towards the EU. The results from both the Standard 
Eurobarometer data and opinion polling data show that mass public opinion support for the EU 
in Ireland remains robust in spite of these two crises. While the EU continues to be regarded 
as an economic project in Ireland what is evident in this analysis is a shift towards more policy 




2. IRISH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS THE EU 
There are a vast variety of data dating from the early 1970s which can be examined in 
order to assess Irish attitudes towards the EU ranging from large-N surveys and opinion polls, 
EU-related referendum results and European Parliament Election results. The focus of this 
paper is to examine mass public opinion towards the EU from the economic and financial crisis 
to the Brexit crisis, therefore the analysis here will focus predominantly on Standard 
Eurobarometer large-N survey data as well as opinion polls pertaining to Brexit as well as some 
tentative analysis on EU-related referendum results. The paper will not examine results of the 
2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections in Ireland as this has been covered extensively 
elsewhere (Quinlan, 2010; Okolikj & Quinlan 2015 & Quinlan & Okolikj, 2016).  
Ireland is often regarded as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of European 
integration since its accession to the EU in 1973 as they are often considered as ‘good 
Europeans’ with a pro-integrationist attitude (Sinnott 1995, Sinnott 2002, Gilland 2002; Sinnott 
2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 2006; Kennedy & Sinnott 2007; Lyons 2008; Adshead & Tonge 
2009). However, the reality of Irish public opinion is more nuanced: support for the EU in 
Ireland is not a single entity, but a complex set of opinions determined by a variety of factors. 
Research has shown that since the 1990’s knowledge about the EU amongst the Irish public is 
low (Gary, Marsh & Sinnott 2005; Holmes 2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 2006; Kennedy & Sinnott 
2007; Laffan & O’Mahony 2008 pp. 128) with individuals in Ireland more likely to refer to the 
economic aspects of the EU, such as the freedom of movement, the Euro and economic 
prosperity. This ‘knowledge deficit’ is perhaps not surprising as for the first twenty years of 
EU membership Ireland’s self-perception of its status within the EU was that of a small, poor, 
peripheral member state. In their examination of the nuances of Irish public opinion toward the 
EU Kennedy and Sinnott (2007) find that Irish individuals’ knowledge of the EU does not 
affect the relationship between opinion of EU support and evaluations of domestic and 
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European institutions. Therefore, the EU project in Ireland is not one which can be 
encapsulated by a single overarching judgment, but by many different facets.  
The pro-EU status of the Irish began to be challenged in the 2000s when Ireland’s 
economic boom led the Irish government into conflict with the EU over its management of the 
Irish economy. The Irish government was criticized for its refusal to dampen the successful 
Celtic Tiger economy and for its substantial tax concessions for foreign investors which were 
(and still are) regarded by the European Commission as breaking the spirit if not law of the 
European Single Market. However, individuals in Ireland tend to focus on national or 
intergovernmental aspects of EU membership and representation rather than on the policy-
making aspects of EU institutions which produce legislation that has an effect across all EU 
member states. Therefore, there remains a proportion of the population who oppose further 
‘sharing of sovereignty’ and are concerned about the impact Ireland’s involvement in the EU 
is having on Irish identity, values and culture. These nuances and the multifaceted nature of 
Irish public opinion towards the EU were borne out in the rejection of the Nice Treaty in May 
2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in June 2008.  
  
The Complexity of EU Referendums in Ireland  
The Republic of Ireland, as a relatively contemporary addition to the international 
community and as a consequence of its strongly nationalist political culture, encouraged the 
insertion in its 1937 constitution of an unambiguous declaration of sovereignty (Coakley, 
2005). The rationale behind the 1973 referendum on accession to the then European Economic 
Community (EEC) was necessary in order to correct the conflict that the obligations of 
membership would cause for the Irish constitution; Bunreacht na hEireann. Under obligations 
of EEC membership, and alongside the supremacy of European law, legislative authority would 
no longer be solely invested in the Oireachtas (legislature of Ireland) and the European Court 
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of Justice (ECJ) would be superior to the Irish Supreme Court. On this basis, a decision was 
made to introduce a catch-all amendment (Article 29.4.3) allowing Ireland to join the EEC 
following a referendum (O’Mahony, 2009). In 1986 however the approval of the Single 
European Act (SEA) led to Crotty vs An Taoiseach- a landmark decision by the Irish Supreme 
Court which found that Ireland could not ratify the SEA unless the Irish constitution was 
amended to permit ratification. The decision was taken to confine the 1987 referendum to the 
specific issue – i.e. the ratification of the SEA rather than introducing an all-encompassing 
amendment that would make all future EU-related referendums unnecessary. As a 
consequence, since 1987, any further integration or extension of EU powers requires a fresh 
referendum in Ireland.  
Subsequently, between 1973 and 2012, Irish governments have held nine European 
referendum campaigns with two broad characteristics emerging from each campaign. Firstly, 
turnout in EU-related referendums is generally lower than at Irish general elections with the 
lowest turnout being 34.79% in the first referendum on the Nice Treaty in 2001 (see Table 1). 
Secondly, EU-related treaties (with the exception of the Accession Treaty in 1973) have gained 
broad support across the political establishment including the mainstream political parties, 
trade unions and business organizations. Political parties such as Sinn Fein and the Green Party 
as well as non-party political and civil society groups have all opposed EU-related 
referendums. Up until the first referendum on the Treaty of Nice in 2001, successive Irish 
governments and pro-European campaigners pointed to the benefits EU membership had 
brought to Ireland in terms of direct financial transfers and increased opportunities for Irish 
workers and Irish industry. Pro-European groups and political parties in Ireland have 
consistently relied upon the permissive consensus and the fact that individuals in Ireland 
appreciated the considerable benefits Ireland derived from EU membership thus little effort 
was made to explain the issues at stake for the Irish electorate. 
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<<Table 1 about here>> 
 
The rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 highlighted the 
potential emergence of a new popular scepticism towards the EU in so far as it concerns Irish 
interests and deeper European integration in Ireland. At Nice 1, consensus across the Irish 
political establishment was in evidence. The smaller political parties of Sinn Fein, the Green 
Party and the Socialist Workers’ party all campaigned against the Nice Treaty. While the Yes 
campaign was promoted to the electorate as being in Ireland’s best interests as it would 
facilitate the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement of the EU in 2004 from fifteen to twenty-five member 
states thereby providing Irish industry access to enlarged European Single market. However, 
with a general election in 2002, political parties advocating a Yes vote were reluctant to spend 
money campaigning on an EU referendum and thus the message proposed to the public was 
unclear (O’Mahony 2009). In contrast, the No campaign including groups such as ‘No to Nice’, 
PANA1 ran a highly committed and visible campaign under the slogan “If You Don’t Know, 
Vote No” placing the knowledge deficit inherent within the mass public of Ireland front and 
centre of the campaign subsequently leading to the rejection of the Nice Treaty by 54% of the 
electorate (with the lowest ever turnout in an EU referendum of 35% see Table 1).  
By Nice 2 in 2002, those advocating a Yes vote did not withdraw from the referendum 
campaign arena and a re-engaged political elite were joined by a wide variety of civil society 
groups organised under the umbrella organisation “Alliance for Europe” and a National Forum 
on Europe was established to communicate the key issues to the wider public in advance of the 
second Nice referendum. These initiatives were directly employed to correct the knowledge 
gap displayed among the public in Nice 1 – and the approaches were successful as 63% of the 
Irish electorate voted to ratify the Nice Treaty in October 2002 (see Table 1).  
                                                     
1 Peace and Neutrality Alliance  
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For Lisbon 1, the political elite retreated from the referendum campaign once again 
through a combination of accident and design – the then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern was 
preoccupied by a judicial enquiry and accompanied with public concern his position came 
under scrutiny. Confusion also existed as to when the referendum would take place given the 
procrastination on naming a date (Laffan & O’Mahony 2008, pp. 116). Between April 
(announcement of Ahern’s intention to resign) and May 2008 (the appointment of Brian Cowen 
as Taoiseach) a political vacuum emerged which was effectively occupied by No to Lisbon 
campaigners such as Libertas, COIR and the People’s Movement (Fitzgibbon, 2012). Those 
advocating a Yes vote to the Lisbon Treaty were aware of the difficulties as it does not contain 
one grand idea (Moravcsik, 2008) – as an amending treaty its focus is on incremental reforms 
to EU decision-making and policy making procedures. Given that Irish public opinion tends to 
focus on economic aspects of the EU, such as the freedom of movement, the Euro and 
economic prosperity, there was concern of how the knowledge deficit would play a role in 
Lisbon 1. This was evident in opinion polls in the lead up to the referendum with a TNS/MBRI 
poll for The Irish Times in November 2007 highlighting that only 25% of individuals surveyed 
intended to vote Yes, 13% intended to vote No while 62% said they did not know or had no 
opinion (TNS/MBRI, 2007). The Yes campaign focused on a narrative of trust to rally the 
electorate using slogans such as “Good for Ireland, Good for Europe” and “Europe Let’s Be at 
the Heart of It”. However, given the early foothold of the No campaign, the Yes campaign 
spent much of its time refuting No campaign arguments as well as misinformation and as such 
the electorate did not vote to ratify the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 (see Table 1).  
By Lisbon 2, the Yes campaign argued that the EU had listened to the concerns of the 
Irish people and responded with legal guarantees which pertained to issues raised by the No 
campaign. With the onset of the economic and financial crisis, the Yes campaign argued that 
full involvement in the EU was essential for the Irish economic recovery. Research by Sinnott 
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et al (2010) confirms that this strategy by the Yes campaign was a success as individuals voted 
Yes in Lisbon 2 as they believed it would lead to an improvement in Ireland’s economic 
prospects. Quinlan (2012) also supports this finding and argues that a switch from No to Yes 
in the Lisbon Treaty referendums is explained not only by the changed economic circumstances 
of Ireland but also by guarantees secured by the Irish government on the issues of corporation 
tax, an EU Commissioner as well as a more informed electorate – thus closing the knowledge 
deficit evident in Lisbon 1.  
Overall, the emergence of referendums as key forums for debate about the EU in Ireland 
has resulted in a much greater degree of polarisation of opinions with Gary, Marsh and Sinnott 
(2005) and Glencross and Trechsel (2011) demonstrating that voting in EU-related 
referendums typically distinguish between ‘second-order’ effects and the impact of 
‘substantive ‘issues’. As Garry (2013) points out, findings with regards to both ‘second-order’ 
and ‘issue-voting’ approaches are of significant theoretical importance for the understanding 
of individual-level political behaviour and normative evaluations of the practicality of using 
the mechanism of referendums to ratify EU treaties. The ‘second order’ effects approach infers 
that the central determinant of vote choice in EU-related referendums is an EU member states 
national party politics and that voters often use referendums in order to express their discontent 
or satisfaction with the incumbent government as well as determining their vote as a result of 
party cues with people voting in accordance with their political party affiliation. While 
according to the ‘issue voting’ approach, voting in EU related referendums is driven by 
individuals’ EU-related concerns i.e. people decide to support, or not support, a treaty based 





The Economic & Financial Crisis – A Turning Point  
The economic and financial crisis can be regarded as a decisive moment in Ireland’s 
relationship with the EU as a result of the economic downturn and a widening of economic 
disparities individuals have experienced. However, despite this turning point Irish attitudes 
towards the EU have remained consistently positive (Simpson, 2018a and 2018b). This can be 
seen in the variety of data sources pertaining to mass public opinion towards the EU in Ireland; 
in particular; EU-related referendum results and large-n surveys and opinion polls,  
Beginning with EU-related referendum results, it is evident from the analysis above 
that when the Irish electorate voted ‘No’ to the Nice Treaty in May 2001 and the Lisbon Treaty 
in June 2008 both the domestic political and economic context played a vital role highlighting 
elements of the ‘second order’ and ‘issue voting’ approaches. In the first Nice Treaty 
referendum three key issues were at stake: sovereignty, neutrality and EU enlargement 
emphasising ‘issue voting’ by the electorate2. In the first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
‘second-order’ factors can be cast aside as satisfaction with the Irish government declined 
significantly between Lisbon 1 and Lisbon 2. The change in the political context from the first 
Lisbon Treaty referendum in June 2008 to the second Lisbon Treaty referendum in October 
2009 was a result of the Irish Government’s attempts to address concerns highlighted by the 
‘No’ campaign on issues in relation to military neutrality, the corporation tax rate, the belief 
that abortion services would be widely available, a weakening of  workers’ rights and a 
reduction in Irish influence at the EU-level due to the loss of a permanent Irish EU 
Commissioner3.  
However, it was perhaps the change in economic context from Lisbon 1 to Lisbon 2 
which was most dramatic as Ireland plunged into recession after the rejection of the first 
                                                     
2 The Irish Government sought Declarations with the EU which were added to the Nice Treaty at an EU Summit 
in Seville in June 2002 which provided protection for the continuation of Irish neutrality  
3 Guarantees on these issues were added as Protocols in the second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty  
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referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. It was frequently expressed that as a result of the onset of 
the economic and financial crisis Ireland was safer as part of a larger economic community that 
could potentially offer Ireland protection, which Ireland did receive through a three-year 
Economic Adjustment Programme or Bailout in December 2010 from the Troika (which it 
exited in December 2013).  
Yet, perhaps the economic context was much more marked for the Fiscal Stability 
Treaty referendum in 2012 than for any other EU-related referendum as a result of the ailing 
Irish economy and the Irish governments’ reliance on a multi-billion Euro loan administered 
by the EU and the IMF. One of the advantages of the Fiscal Stability Treaty is it addressed 
only one area: economic policy. This made it much less likely for debate over ratification by 
social and cultural issues that had become prominent in Nice 1 and Lisbon 1. Ireland was 
supportive of the Fiscal Stability Treaty – as a small EU member state suffering the effects of 
the Eurozone crisis and domestic banking failures, Ireland regarded the Fiscal Stability Treaty 
as a means to regain stability, growth and market confidence (Costello, 2012). And the Irish 
electorate recognised this and voted to ratify the Fiscal Stability Treaty in May 2012 by 60% 
(see Table 1).  
Despite the emergence of a potential popular scepticism from 2001-2008 and the 
financial bailout received in 2010, Irish attitudes towards the EU continued to remain 
consistently positive. Analysis of large-N survey data; most notably Standard Eurobarometer 
data from 1972 – 2017 shows that support for the EU in Ireland since 1987 in particular has 
been above the EU average and reached a record high of 83% in 2017 (see Figure 1) – with 
individuals in Ireland believing that membership of the EU is a ‘good thing’ for Ireland.  
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
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The robustness of Ireland’s support for the EU is reiterated further by Standard 
Eurobarometer data from 2009 – 2014 at the peak of the economic and financial crisis which 
demonstrates that the Irish electorate maintained that the EU was the best placed institution to 
take effective action against the economic and financial crisis (See Figure 2).  
 
<<Figure 2 about here>> 
 
This vigour of support by individuals in Ireland for the EU is echoed when examining 
how individuals in Ireland perceive they have benefited from EU membership. Support for the 
EU is once again above the EU average since 1984 in particular reaching an all-time high in 
2018 of 91% - the highest across all 28 EU member states.  
 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
The individual-level responses in Figure 2 are notable as they highlight that individuals 
in Ireland regard the Irish state as much less effective in its action to manage the effects of the 
economic crisis since Spring 2010. Additionally, what is robustly evident from all three 
analyses here is that despite the financial Bailout from the Troika in 2010 individuals in Ireland 
want more, not less, EU integration – individuals in Ireland continue to remain enthusiastic 
supporters of the EU (see Figure 1 and 2) – they believe that membership of the EU is a good 
thing and that overall Ireland has benefited from membership of the EU.  
 
The Brexit Crisis – Turning Point 2.0 
 The vote by the UK to leave the EU on 23rd June 2016 constituted a remarkable shock 
to both British and UK politics. And this shock resonated just as much in Dublin. While the 
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Irish government had put contingency plans in place, the 2016 EU referendum result in the UK 
placed Ireland in an unenviable and difficult position. The UK is not just Ireland’s nearest 
neighbour. It is one of Ireland’s “largest trading partners, the main market for Irish agri-food 
produce, the geographic link to the continent (Ireland’s land bridge) in getting goods to market 
and its most important ally within the European Council and the Council of Ministers” 
(O’Brennan, 2019 pp. 2; see Murphy this issue). Brexit therefore represents the single greatest 
political and economic challenge to Ireland since World War Two.  
Ireland’s unique circumstances, including the issue of peace in Northern Ireland and 
the preservation of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), must be addressed in Brexit 
negotiations. Firstly, the future trade relationship between the EU and the UK will be crucial 
to both constituent parts of the island of Ireland. Secondly, the relationship, whether it is the 
result of EU-UK relations, or a relationship specifically designed to address Ireland’s 
circumstances, does not solely depend on the nature of the border between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, and no border, whether it is visible or invisible, can create a 
satisfactory result if the economic arrangements are unsound. Hence, why the Irish government 
has advocated for the UK, or at a minimum Northern Ireland, to remain in the European Single 
Market and the Customs Union (Murphy, 2018; see Murphy this issue).  
There is undoubtedly an awareness that Ireland has a special case in relation to Brexit. 
As a senior EU Commission official states “Ireland is a good EU citizen… […] … they went 
through the crisis and agony of the [bailout] programme and came out as a poster boy for 
resilience and toughing it out. So, what is at stake is absolutely enormous” (EU Commission 
cited in Connelly, 2017 pp. 342). The weight of Ireland’s concerns – trade and Northern Ireland 
– has allowed the Irish government to fuse the two issues in its negotiating strategy. As a Senior 
Irish diplomat affirms; “the logic of the peace process is based on a method to depoliticize the 
underlying constitutional problems, and to create a zone of peace and prosperity. That peace 
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and prosperity is underlined by the free movement of goods and services” (Irish Diplomat cited 
in Connelly, 2017 pp. 342). Therefore, Brexit negotiations have demonstrated a remarkable 
‘reverse asymmetry’ (O’Brennan, 2019 pp. 2) in UK-Irish relations as the historical dynamic 
of British power over Ireland has yielded itself to the inside-outside asymmetrical logic of the 
Article 50 negotiations. Ireland’s status as a privileged EU insider has created a position 
whereby it can veto any Withdrawal Agreement/Treaty that did not include a Backstop4 clause 
on the Irish border.  
Public Opinion support for the Irish governments’ negotiating strategy and 
management thus far of Brexit has been overwhelmingly positive. This is reflected in two 
opinion polls – The Sunday Business Post/RED C Poll5 in January 2019 and the Sky Data Poll6 
in February 2019 which ask a nationally representative sample of respondents’ questions which 
pertain specifically to individual attitudes towards Brexit in Ireland. The Sunday Business 
Post/Red C poll asks two specific questions relating to the Backstop in particular. And the 
findings are thought-provoking – 70% of respondents agreed that the Irish government should 
refuse to put up border infrastructure if there is a hard Brexit (24% disagree and 6% were 
unsure) and 64% disagreed that the Irish government should drop the Backstop from the Brexit 
Withdrawal Agreement in order to help former Prime Minister Theresa May7 get the deal 
through the House of Commons ahead of the UK’s departure from the EU on 29th March 20198. 
                                                     
4 The Backstop is an insurance policy to avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
if a free trade deal between the UK and the EU is not reached by the end of the Transition period of 2020. For a 
full and comprehensive analysis of the Irish Backstop please see Brexit and the Backstop” Everything You Need 
to Know, The UK In Changing Europe, 11th February 2019, available at: https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-the-
backstop-everything-you-need-to-know/ Accessed: 17/04/19  
5 The Sunday Business Post/Red C Poll interviewed a random sample of 1,000 adults (N=1,000) aged 18+ by 
telephone between 17th - 24th January 2019. Respondents were asked four questions and asked to respond either 
Agree, Disagree or Unsure.  
6 The Sky Data Poll interviewed a nationally representative sample of 1,611 Sky Customers in the Republic of 
Ireland (N=1,611) online from 1-4th February 2019. Data are weighted to the profile of the population.  
7 Prime Minister Theresa May stepped down as Leader of the Conservative Party on 7th June 2019 triggering a 
leadership contest within the Conservative Party and thus a new UK Prime Minister  
8 At the time of writing an extension to Article 50 until 31st October 2019 had been granted by the EU. Therefore, 
the UK did not leave the EU as scheduled on 29th March 2019.  
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This is reiterated further in the Sky Data Poll where 79% of individuals in Ireland think that 
the Irish government should persist for a legal guarantee that there will be no hard border on 
the island of Ireland with just 7% of individuals in Ireland believing that the Irish government 
should prioritize a No Deal Brexit.  
Findings from the Sky Data poll are also positive for the Irish government and for the 
EU – 60% of respondents believe the Irish government has done a good job in negotiating 
Brexit (17% think the Irish government has done a bad job and 23% unsure). In contrast, a vast 
majority – 84% of individuals in Ireland think that the UK government had done a bad job in 
Brexit negotiations with just 6% believing it has done a good job. Finally, from an economic 
perspective, Irish respondents continue to align and display positive support for the EU. When 
asked to choose who to cut economic ties with 81% of respondents said the UK, while only 
19% said the EU.  
 
The possibility of an Irexit 
 Relative to the rest of the EU, Ireland is especially vulnerable to the fallout from Brexit, 
both economically and politically. As a result, some argue that an Irish exit, or Irexit, from the 
EU would benefit the nation. The question of Irexit has developed primarily as an economic 
argument implying that Ireland will be left marginalised, peripheral and dependent post Brexit. 
Therefore, Irexit would allow for reintegration with the UK, thus reinstating close ties with one 
of its largest trading partners. From a political perspective, the formation of the Irexit Freedom 
Party coined as a “national movement of the Irish people which has as its primary objective 
the re-establishment of the national independence and sovereignty of Ireland and the restoration 
of national democracy to be achieved through leaving the European Union” (Irexit Freedom 
party, 2019) has politicised the Irexit debate. Primarily, the movement draws upon those 
individuals who feel aggrieved, display anti-establishment sentiments and who prescribe to the 
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left-behind thesis (Goodwin & Heath 2016a). However, there are also disconnects between the 
disparate elements in those attending events held by the Irexit Freedom Party with many 
holding divergent views on immigration as well as the lack of leadership and direction of the 
group.  
Overall however, there are four fundamental economic and political problems with the 
Irexit thesis. Firstly, from an economic perspective, the stance on a possible Irexit omits the 
question of how Ireland developed economic independence and moved on from political 
domination by the UK when it joined the EU in 1973. Irish accession to the EU enabled the 
diversification in trade and investment, including the European Single Market, but also 
attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the USA. Research by Davies & Francois 
(2018) also highlights that an economic realignment with the UK, moving away from the 
European Single Market, would “substantially worsen the impacts of Brexit, with lower-skill 
and agricultural workers being disproportionately affected” (Davies & Francois, 2018 p. 455). 
Emphasizing that while the UK is indeed one of Ireland’s most important trading partners, 
trade with the rest of the EU is much more important. Secondly, from a political perspective, 
the equal partnership between the UK and Ireland as EU member states facilitated negotiations 
on the issue of peace in Northern Ireland and in particular the Good Friday Agreement (See 
Murphy this issue; Murphy, 2018; Brennan, 2019). Thirdly, while populism may have ignited 
the two biggest political shocks of recent times; Brexit and the election of Trump as President 
of the USA, in Ireland there has been little proliferation on the Conservative hard right. This 
dispels, from a political and theoretical perspective, the basis and rationale for the Irexit 
movement. Fourthly and finally, public opinion support for the EU in Ireland is consistently 
positive and there is little appetite among individuals in Ireland to leave the EU. This can be 
seen both longitudinally through large-N survey data and through public opinion polls.   
Positive public opinion support for the EU in Ireland is reiterated across several data 
 16 
sources. The annual European Movement Ireland/RED C Poll in March 20189 found that 92% 
of individuals in Ireland believe that Ireland should remain a part of the EU, 87% of individuals 
believe that on balance Ireland has benefited from being a member of the EU and that despite 
the UK leaving the EU (i.e. Brexit) 87% of individuals in Ireland disagree that Ireland should 
also leave the EU. These are robust findings for both support for the EU and the Irexit debate.  
Beginning with support for the EU, overall the findings from the EMI/RED C Poll largely echo 
the findings from Standard Eurobarometer data. Between 2013 and 2018, when asked the 
question “Taking everything into consideration, Ireland has on balance benefited from being 
a member of the EU” the lowest level of support for the EU in Ireland was 80% (Standard 
Eurobarometer data 2013) while the highest was 91% (Standard Eurobarometer data 2018). 
Overall however, as Figure 410 illustrates there is little variation between the two data sources 
demonstrating the robust public opinion support for the EU in Ireland.  
 
<<Figure 4 About Here>> 
 
When considering the case for Irexit it is necessary to examine opinion polling data 
from 2018 as well as the latest Standard Eurobarometer data findings. In the 2018 European 
Movement/Red C Poll there are two questions which examine Irexit. While there is 
understandable uncertainty about what changes and challenges Brexit will herald for Ireland, 
individuals are clear that leaving the EU is not in Ireland’s interests. In the 2018 European 
Movement Ireland/RED C Poll, when asked ‘If the UK were to leave the EU, Ireland should 
                                                     
9 The RED C Poll commissioned by the European Movement Ireland has been conducted annually since 2013 
(apart from 2014 when no poll was commissioned) in order to ascertain the views of Irish people on a variety of 
issues related to Ireland – EU relations. The 2018 poll was conducted between 15th – 21st March 2018 among a 
representative sample of 1,000 individuals in Ireland (N=1,000) aged 18+. A series of statements were read out 
and respondents were asked by Red C to Agree Strongly, Agree Slightly, Disagree Strongly or Disagree Slightly.  
10 The question “Taking everything into consideration, Ireland has on balance benefited from being a member of 
the EU” was asked in both the European Movement Ireland/Red C Poll and Standard Eurobarometer survey 
allowing a direct comparison between both polling and survey data. Please note that no European Movement 
Ireland/RED C Poll was conducted in 2014 thus there is unfortunately a lapse in the time series analysis. 
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leave too” only 11% of individuals in Ireland agree that Ireland should in fact leave the EU. 
This demonstrates a dramatic decline from 2013 when support for Ireland leaving the EU in 
the event of Brexit was at 29%11.  
 
<<Figure 5 About Here>> 
 
In the same poll, individuals were asked whether Ireland should remain a part of the 
EU with 92% of respondents agreeing with the statement. Again, this finding demonstrates 
consistent and positive support for the EU since 2013 with support for membership of the EU 
increasing since year on year since 2013 (See Figure 6).  
 
<<Figure 6 About Here>> 
 
In addition, one of the most comprehensive opinion polls conducted on EU membership 
in Ireland since the 2016 Brexit vote in the UK compliments the findings of the 2018 European 
Movement/Red C Poll findings. When asked whether Ireland should remain a member of the 
EU, 94% of respondents in the Ireland Thinks12 poll agreed with this statement. Moreover, in 
the latest 2018 Standard Eurobarometer13 individuals were asked “If a referendum was held 
tomorrow regarding Ireland’s membership of the EU, how would you vote?” with 85% of 
individuals stating they would vote to remain in the EU -  the highest of all twenty-seven EU 
member states and 19% above the EU average.  
                                                     
11 Please note that no European Movement Ireland/RED C Poll was conducted in 2014.  
12 The Ireland Thinks poll was conducted between 15th – 24th August 2018 among a random sample of 942 
individuals in Ireland aged 18+.  
13 Standard Eurobarometer 90.1 was conducted between 8th – 26th September 2018 among all EU27 (N=27,601) 
aged 16+. For Ireland, N= 1,001  
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Overall, the Irexit debate is a crude caricature of Ireland’s political and economic 
situation which falls back on inherent clichés (i.e. Ireland is a small, peripheral member state, 
reliance on the UK etc.), disregarding Ireland’s success in Brexit negotiations (i.e. ensuring the 
UK cannot move forward to trade negotiations until the unique Irish issues have been full 
addressed) and provides no indication of what Irexit and the future relationship with the EU 
would look like. But perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates a rudimentary understanding 
of Irish attitudes towards the EU. An Irexit is highly questionable.  
 
3. IRELAND’S FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE EU: MOVING ON FROM 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND EMBRACING BREXIT 
The economic crisis and the Irish context highlights the heightened risk of economic 
adversity for individuals as a result of rising economic problems in both Ireland and the EU. 
These individuals are more supportive of income distribution as a means to minimize their own 
economic insecurity (Simpson & Loveless 2017, Simpson 2018) with the focus on European 
integration now moving towards a more individualist egocentric perspective. European 
integration and governance have been centrally important in the economic transformation of 
Ireland, particularly through the alignment of state strategy with the action of economic and 
social interests. Given the economic and financial crisis, inequality not only heightened 
individual level concerns about economic stability, but it has also demonstrated that context, 
especially in the case of Ireland, is important and has directly influenced politics (Simpson, 
2018).  
In many ways, the outcome of the UK’s referendum on EU membership was not 
surprising. Firstly, public opinion in the UK has consistently been the most Eurosceptic 
electorate in the EU since it joined the EU in 1973. Secondly, it is well-established that 
referendums on European integration are highly unpredictable and that voters often reject 
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proposals put to them by the government even when supported by a consensus among 
mainstream political parties and experts (Franklin et al 1994, 1995; Hobolt, 2009). One the one 
hand, the outcome of the EU referendum is a unique event since no other member state has 
decided to exit the EU. One the other hand, the sentiments that led to the outcome of Brexit are 
by no means a British phenomenon with anti-immigration, anti-establishment and stark 
demographic divides between the winners and losers of the European integration process. 
Typically Remain voters were likely to be younger, a graduate of a university and receiving a 
higher income while Leave voters were likely to be older, with a lower level of educational 
attainment and earning a low income (Goodwin & Health, 2016a & 2016b). The challenge of 
Brexit for the EU, and for the member states, is that many voters across Europe see the EU as 
part of the problem rather than the solution when it comes to protecting ordinary citizens from 
the challenges of an ever more integrated world.  
However, Ireland again somewhat bucks this trend as research shows that even during 
the economic and financial crisis and financial bailouts received from the Troika/International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Ireland remained avid supporters of European integration (Simpson 
2018). Yet, in the context of Brexit, since Ireland is the member state which is most exposed 
to the economic effects of Brexit as a result of all trade between the UK and Ireland being 
governed under the EU framework of the Customs Union and the European Single Market 
could Brexit determine a potential transformation in Irish public opinion towards the EU which 
wasn’t experienced during the economic and financial crisis and goes beyond the feeble Irexit 
debate? One which focuses on European integration in a more policy orientated perspective? 
Overall, Standard Eurobarometer data does not contain specific questions about Brexit. 
However, if the issue of Brexit permeates mass public opinion in Ireland we would expect it to 
influence individual level attitudes on the current economic situation in Ireland and in 
particular Ireland’s future economic prospects. Figure 7 asks respondents “What do you think 
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are the two most important issues facing [Ireland]?” from 2007 – 2018 assessing issues such 
as crime, the economic situation (of Ireland), the cost of living, unemployment, housing, 
immigration and health and social security. This Eurobarometer data allows an examination of 
key issues facing Ireland during the economic and financial crisis and following the Brexit 
vote.  
Firstly, focusing on the economic and financial crisis, between 2008 and 2015 the two 
most important issues individuals believed Ireland was facing were the economic situation and 
unemployment. The economic situation was regarded as the most important issue for Ireland 
in 2008 and the second most important issue in the period 2009 - 201414. While the issue of 
unemployment was considered to be the most important issue facing Ireland between 2009 – 
2014. These findings are consistent with previous research that identifies individuals 
experiencing economic adversity during the economic and financial crisis as a result of rising 
economic problems in both Ireland and the EU. Secondly, from 2015 – 2018, a period which 
captures the context of pre, and (immediate) post, Brexit individuals report more policy 
orientated issues as the most important issues facing Ireland, most notably housing and health 
and social security. From 2015 – 2018, housing was regarded as the most important issue for 
Ireland while health and social security was viewed as the second most important issue.  
However, perhaps the most notable shift in key issues since 2015 is the fact that 
individuals’ economic perceptions and expectations are overwhelmingly positive In Ireland. 
Since 2015, there has been a steady decline in individuals reporting that the economic situation 
is one of the most important issues in Ireland - from 13% in 2015 to just 8% in 2018 – which 
is between six to seven percentage points lower than the EU average for the same period. The 
same pattern can be reported for the issue of unemployment. Since 2016, individuals have 
                                                     
14 Please note that the data is unavailable for the question What do you think are the two most important issues 
facing [Ireland]? as this question was not asked in any Standard Eurobarometer in 2011 therefore there is a break 
in the time series.  
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reported a decline in unemployment as the most important issue for Ireland – from 24% in 
2016 to 14% in 2018 – and between four and nine percentage points lower than the EU average 
for the same period. The positive shift in public opinion towards the economy during a period 
of political and potential economic instability in light of Brexit highlights there are limited 
concerns for economic pessimism in Ireland.  
 
<<Figure 7 About Here>> 
 
Standard Eurobarometer data can also examine what individuals believe to be the most 
important issues they are facing at the moment allowing an analysis at the individual-level as 
well as the macro-level. Figure 8 asks respondents “And personally, what are the two most 
important issues you are facing at the moment?” from 2009 – 201815 assessing the same issues 
such as crime, (personal) economic situation, the cost of living, unemployment, housing, 
immigration and health and social security. This Eurobarometer data allows an examination of 
key issues facing individuals in Ireland during the economic and financial crisis and following 
the Brexit vote. Between 2009 – 2014, the two most important issues facing individuals in 
Ireland are the economic situation (the most important issue in 2009 and 2010, second most 
important issue in 2012), unemployment (the second most important issue in 2009 and 2010) 
and the cost of living (most important issue in 2012, 2013 and 2014). Again, these findings are 
consistent with the Eurobarometer data outlined in Figure 7 as well as previous research that 
identifies individuals experiencing economic adversity during the economic and financial crisis 
                                                     
15 Please note that the data is unavailable for the question And personally, what are the two most important issues 
you are facing at the moment]? as this question was not asked in any Standard Eurobarometer in 2011 therefore 
there is a break in the time series.  
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as a result of rising economic problems in both Ireland and the EU. Put simply, during the 
economic and financial crisis economic pessimism at the individual-level was widespread.  
From 2015 – 2018 however, the two most important issues facing individuals are both 
economic and policy orientated. From 2015, the cost of living is reported as the most important 
issue individuals are facing in Ireland with health and social care reported as the second most 
important issue for individuals. What is noteworthy here is that both of these issues are far 
higher in Ireland than the EU average. This demonstrates that there is the possibility of a 
potential Brexit effect and sense of economic pessimism at the individual-level not experienced 
at the macro-level. However, it may be argued that for individuals in Ireland the question of 
whether and perhaps how Brexit will have an impact on Ireland at the macro-level and 
individual-level may not have a clear answer. There are indeed no specific Brexit questions 
from which to draw upon in Standard Eurobarometer data and Brexit is being contextualized 
in economic terms. Yet, what is clear is policy-orientated issues concerning health care, social 
care and principles of the welfare state are of great concern for individuals in Ireland.  
 
<<Figure 8 About Here>> 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
The Irish government’s concerns about Brexit were first outlined in the 2014 National 
Risk Assessment and outlined that a period of uncertainty regarding the UK’s relationship with 
the EU would have an impact on Ireland in three areas. Firstly, in the pursuit of Ireland’s 
objectives as an EU member state, secondly regarding bilateral relations with the UK including 
the economic and trading relationship and thirdly issues in relation to Northern Ireland.  The 
UK decision to leave the EU apportioned a considerable shock to Irish national interests. There 
are serious economic concerns about the potential detrimental effect of the UK being outside 
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the European Single Market and Customs Union. The erection of barriers to trade between the 
UK and Ireland poses fundamental risks to the Irish economy while the effects of Brexit on the 
Common Travel Area (CTA) are also problematic (See Murphy, this issue; Murphy, 2018). 
However, when examining public opinion and the effect that Brexit will have on the macro-
level and individual-level there does not appear to be a Brexit effect regarding the Irish 
economy – overall, attitudes towards the economy and individuals’ personal economic 
situation are overwhelmingly positive. Perhaps a potential Brexit effect is still too early to 
determine for mass public opinion for two reasons. Firstly, there are no questions relating to 
Brexit specifically in the Standard Eurobarometer data over this time period and secondly the 
potential effects of Brexit are still in fact not known. This makes examining mass public 
opinion in relation to attitudes towards Brexit cumbersome.  
However, it can be posited from both sets of opinion polling data that an Irexit is 
unlikely and that individuals in Ireland believe that EU membership is a good thing – this is a 
robust finding as it is also reflected in the analyses of Standard Eurobaromter also. One of the 
central components of the Irish government’s approach to Brexit has been to engage with civil 
society and stakeholders in particular creating an All-Island Civic Dialogue on Brexit a 
participative and consultative exercise that aimed to hear directly about the all-island 
implications of Brexit from a variety of stakeholders and across a wide range of sectors. The 
All-Island Civic Dialogue provided new opportunities for methods of public discussion among 
civil society actors which had not existed previously. Over time, these forums may conceivably 
elevate public knowledge of the EU and therefore impact on attitudes towards the EU.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Ireland, and perhaps more specifically Irish public opinion, has weathered the storm of 
the economic and financial crisis and (so far) the Brexit crisis and the debate around a potential 
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Irexit. While an Irexit is unlikely, Ireland’s relationship with the EU will not be without its 
challenges. Firstly, in the context of Brexit on issues such as the economic impact Ireland will 
experience as a consequence of the UK leaving the EU as well as questions pertaining to the 
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Secondly, in the context of the 
future relationship with the EU most notably the Apple tax ruling. While a knowledge deficit 
continues to exist among the mass public in Ireland with regards to the EU the salience of EU 
membership and therefore support for the EU is consistently strong, robust and shows little 
sign of abating. Brexit has forced Ireland to think anew about its relationship with the UK and 
the EU and instead of turning towards an historical periphery Ireland recognizes that current 
challenges are global and do not respect borders. As a consequence, Ireland is best placed to 
meet these changes through continued cooperation and engagement subsequently influencing 
solutions as part of the EU. Brexit may indeed mean Brexit but for Ireland remaining a member 
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No 39.71% 
Turnout 50.60% 









Figure 1: Support for the EU in Ireland 1973-2017 
 
Source: Standard Eurobarometer Data 1973-2018, N= 1,009 
 
 























































































































Figure 3: Benefited from EU Membership 1984-2018 
 




Figure 4: Benefited from EU Membership 2013 – 2018 Survey & Polling Data 
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Figure 5: Brexit should lead to Irexit  
 
Source: EMI/RED C Poll 2013 – 2018, N=1,000  
 
 
Figure 6: Ireland should Remain Part of EU   
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Figure 7: Most Important Issue for Ireland 2007 - 2018 
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Figure 8: Most Important Issue for you Personally 2009 – 2018 
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